Input Allocation, Workforce Managment and Productivity Spillovers: Evidence from Personnel Data, 2016 [pdf]
with Francesco Amodio
revise and resubmit requested by The Review of Economic Studies.
This paper shows how human resource management practices and input heterogeneity jointly trigger productivity spillovers at the workplace. In an egg production plant in rural Peru, workers produce output combining effort with inputs of heterogeneous quality. Exploiting quasi-random variation in the productivity of inputs assigned to workers, we find evidence of a negative causal effect of an increase in coworkers’ daily output on own output and its quality. We show both theoretically and empirically that the effect captures free riding among workers, which originates from the way the management informs its decisions on whether and who to dismiss. Evidence also suggests that providing monetary and social incentives can offset negative productivity spillovers. Our study and results show that production and human resource management practices interact in the generation of externalities at the workplace. Counterfactual analyses suggest productivity gains from the implementation of alternative input assignment schedules and dismissal policies to be up to 20%.
Behavioral Spillovers in Organizations: A Selective Review, 2016 [pdf]
Forthcoming in Research in Experimental Economics Vol. 19: Experiments in Organizational Economics
We present an overview of research on spillover effects within firms and introduce a classification of the literature. We divide spillovers into either technological or social in nature. In our classification, a technological spillover is one in which an agent rationally responds to a cue in the workplace that does not rely on the identity or characteristics of a coworker. Social spillovers, on the other hand, may be thought of as arising from the social preferences of an individual or social norms established in the organization.
Delegation and Team Selection in Organizations: Theory and Experimental Evidence, 2016 [pdf]
with John R. Hamman
We model a managerial decision environment in which a manager both determines the skill heterogeneity of her workers and determines whether to retain or delegate the ability to allocate tasks. The manager prefers delegating when uncertainty is suciently high relative to the incentive conflict with her workers, which is endogenously determined by her chosen team composition. Experimental data supports the direction of the main predictions, though it shows how and why participants deviate from expected behavior. Generally, the results highlight the difficulties in navigating complex managerial environments and illustrate potentially costly ways in which managers seek to simplify their decisions.
WORK IN PROGRESS
Piece-rate Incentive Schemes and Heterogeneous Inputs Across Workers
Incentive Regime Switch and Learning at the Workplace
with Francesco Amodio
Long vs Short Run Matching Effects: A Study of the NFL Draft
with Pablo Casas, Stephen Hansen and F. Asís Martínez-Jerez
OTHER WORKING PAPERS
Curriculum Vitae [ pdf ]
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Last modified November/2016